Why do human phobias last for months or years when such behavior should undergo extinction? This failure of extinction or persistence of self-defeating behavior of human disorders was labeled by Mowrer as the neurotic paradox. The paradox is cited by an ever-increasing number of critics who challenge any laboratory-based learning model of human psychopathology. Laboratory research, of course, omits essential requirements in the analysis of behavior, and the principles derived from such analyses must be combined in order to explain complex human behavaior. Validation for a behavioral model can thus be achieved if (a) basic principles inferred from observation of humans treated with a laboratory-derived extinction procedure (e.g., implosive therapy) are combined with (b) principles examined in laboratory research that are combined to generate unique predictions that correspond to known features of human phobic behavior. The latter evidence is briefly reviewed in research demonstrating sustained responding over one thousand consecutive active avoidance responses with complete avoidance of the "phobic" CS for an initial single shock trial. Differential reinforcement for responses to early sequential stimuli depends on minimal work requirement, and reinforcement by timeout from avoidance. This combination of factors effectively precludes extinction to main conditioned aversive stimuli for nonhumans, as it does for human phobias. Support for a laboratory model of human phobia is thereby attained.
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Laboratory-derived principles of learning and conditioning have played an important role in the development ofsignificant applied and conceptual advances in the etiology and treatment of human psychopathological conditions (Dollard & Miller, 1950;  Kalish, 1981; Mowrer, 1939; Skinner, 1953 Skinner, , 1954 Stampfl & Levis, 1967; Ullmann & Krasner, 1965) . The interplay between reinforcement and extinction principles culled from an enormous amount of research in the learning laboratory proved remarkably fruitful in accounting for many facets of maladaptive behavior as seen in neurotic and psychotic patients. Recently, however, there has been a rising insistence in This article is a a greatly expanded version of a symposium presentation conducted at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Washington, DC, August, 1986 : Learning research and the neurotic paradox, in Steven C. Hayes (Chair). Stop running on empty: Some clinical implications ofbasic research. The author is indebted to Patricia D'Auria for running some of the animals, and for help in the design of the proper control conditions for some of the research reported in the paper.
Reprints may be obtained from Thomas G. Stampfl, Department of Psychology, University of Milwaukee, WI 53201. the behavior therapy literature that central difficulties exist in learning formulations directed to the problems of human psychopathology (Barlow, 1982; Boulougouris, 1982; Eysenck, 1976 Eysenck, , 1979 Rachman, 1976 Rachman, , 1977 Wilson, 1982) .
The neurotic paradox is often presented as one of the major limitations upon which any laboratory-derived system of behavior founders. An example ofthe challenge to behavior theory based on the neurotic paradox is that ofEysenck (1976) 
Skinner, his colleagues and pupils have in recent years advanced a theory which is offered as a general theory of human conduct; this is based essentially on operant behaviour and the effects of positive and negative reinforcements.... Summaries of recent attempts to apply these principles to neurotic and psychotic behaviour are interesting in that they fail to deal with the central paradox of neurosis, as defined by Mowrer; as he indicates, it is precisely because neurotic behaviour does not follow Thorndike's law of effect, or Skinner's laws of reinforcement, that a special theory is required to account for these departures.... Restatement ofthe general theory does not solve the riddle. (p. 252) THE NEUROTIC PARADOX In 1926, Freud (1926 Freud ( /1936 described a basic theoretical problem, the resolu-tion of which defied repeated attempts at solution:
We consider it entirely normal that a little girl should weep bitterly at the age of four if her doll is broken, at the age of six if her teacher reprimands her, at the age of sixteen if her sweetheart neglects her, at the age of twenty-five, perhaps, if she buries her child. Each ofthese grief-occasioning situations has its proper time and vanishes with its passing; but the later and more definite ones remain operative throughout life. We should be rather surprised, in fact, if this girl, after she had become a wife and mother, should weep over some knickknack getting broken. Yet this is how neurotics behave. Although in their mental apparatus there have long since developed all the agencies necessary for dealing with a wide range of stimuli, although they are mature enough to be able to gratify the greater part of their needs themselves .. . they nevertheless behave as though the old danger situation still existed, they remain under the spell of all the old causes of anxiety.... But how does this situation come about?
Why are not all neuroses merely episodes in the individual's development which become a closed chapter when the next stage of development is reached? Whence comes the element of permanency in these reactions to danger? ... In other words, we find ourselves abruptly confronted once again by the oft-repeated riddle: What is the source of neurosis, what is its ultimate, its specific, underlying principle? After decades ofanalytic effort this problem rises up before us, as untouched as at the beginning. (pp. 89-92) Mowrer (1948, 1950, 1952) It was inevitable, however, that such widespread application to "complex" human behavior understood with principles derived mainly from animal research would result in some serious difficulties. Domjan (1987) recently expressed the contemporary point ofview when he said:
The belief that results of animal research can (and should) be used to understand human behavior was most ardently pursued by B. F. Skinner and his students, who created a worldview of human behavior based on animal research (see, for example, Skinner, 1953) . Such enthusiastic embrace of animal research has been discouraged by increasing evidence of the complexity of various forms of human behavior. (pp. 558-559) In the area of human psychopathology it certainly appears that the behaviors involved are complex. But (Skinner, 1953, p. 370) , that, in effect, facilitates through extinction the report of additional punishing (aversive) events by the patient. Skinner (1953) de- scribed the consequences of this therapeutic relationship as follows:
The appearance of previously punished behavior in the presence of a nonpunishing audience makes possible the extinction of some of the effects of punishment. This is the principal result of such therapy. Stimuli which are automatically generated by the patient's own behavior become less and less aversive and less and less likely to generate emotional reactions. The patient feels less wrong, less guilty, or less sinful. As a direct consequence he is less likely to exhibit the various forms of operant behavior which, as we have seen, provide escape from such self-generated stimulation. (p. 371) Skinner (1953) clearly specifies how these maladaptive behaviors emerge, What is "wrong" with the individual who displays these by-products of punishment is easily stated. A particular personal history has produced an organism whose behavior is disadvantageous or dangerous. (p. 372) By accounting for a given example of disadvantageous behavior in terms of a personal history and by altering or supplementing that history as a form of therapy, we are considering the very variables to which the traditional theorist must ultimately turn for an explanation of his supposed inner causes. (p.
379)
That extinction plays a direct function as a treatment manipulation is seen in Skinner's suggestion for various phobic-like fears, Eliminating a conditioned response is also a common practical problem. For example, we may want to reduce the fear reactions which have come to be evoked by people, animals, air raids, or military combat. Following the procedures in the conditioned-reflex experiment, we present a conditioned stimulus while omitting the reinforcing stimulus responsible for its effect. (p. 58) It is interesting that Skinner (1953) also included "anxiety" as a possibly more important stimulus condition than some of his other statements concerning anxiety would imply when he said:
Although the emotional aspect of anxiety may be distinguished from the conditioned aversive effect responsible for avoidance behavior, it is possible that the emotion is also aversive. Avoidance responses may be interpreted as in part an escape from the emotional components of anxiety. Thus we avoid the dentist's office, not only because it precedes painful stimulation and is therefore a negative reinforcer, but because, having preceded such stimulation, it arouses a complex emotional condition which is also aversive. (p. 179) To sum up Skinner's main concern with traditional theoretical conceptions of the causes of human psychopathology, one must conclude that the concern is not necessarily with the environmental events specified by such theorists, but by the use made of them in their metaphysical constructions. In Skinner's (1954) Stampfl (1961) , is one such example. It was based on Mowrer's twofactor theory of avoidance learning (see London, 1964) , but its theoretical underpinnings deviate in no significant way from the first alternative delineated by Skinner (1953 Skinner ( , 1954 see Levis, 1980; Stampfl, 1966 Stampfl, , 1970 Stampfl & Levis, 1967 , 1969 , 1973 There is a strong tendency in contemporary writings, from the research report to the undergraduate text, to follow the fashion of the moment, to abandon-almost frivolously-well-established principles in favor of whatever fits the spirit of the time. Both of these limitations may be challenged. Avoidance of CSs in serial CS laboratory studies has been clearly demonstrated (Boyd & Levis, 1976; Kostanek & Sawrey, 1965; Levis, 1979 ; Levis & Boyd, 1979 (Sidman, 1957; Sidman & Boren, 1957) . To determine the aversiveness of the warning stimulus (CS) based on its proximity to shock, the work component must be experimentally controlled. When it is, relative avoidance of the warning stimulus (CS) emerges (Logan & Boice, 1968) . The major reference used by Mineka and others to support the contention that animals do not avoid the CS is that ofSidman (1955a) in which the work variable was not controlled (see Mineka, 1979a Mineka, , 1979b Hineline, 1977 Hineline, , 1981 that requires a separate article to examine how they relate to the specific thesis ofthis paper (see, e.g., Field & Boren, 1963) . Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to argue on the basis of conditioned aversive or even conditioned fear theories of avoidance behavior that stimuli correlated with work would themselves acquire aversive or fear eliciting properties. Thus, the various properties ofSidman avoidance schedules that include warning stimuli may be interpreted as conditioned aversive stimuli that the animal will escape from if given the opportunity to do so. Ifdarkness were correlated with a higher rate of responding (work) than the rate of responding with light, then darkness as a stimulus will be more aversive than the light stimulus. The relative aversiveness will be reversed if the response-shock interval controlling response rate (work requirement) is also reversed for the two stimulus conditions. An examination of "one trial" fear conditioning in human phobics also reveals that a strong argument can be made that multiple trials are actually involved in the "single trial" human case, as "trial" is defined in the laboratory.
For the moment, however, let us accept Mineka's (1985) (1) and (2) should generate a very large number of successive (consecutive) active avoidance responses with few, if any, signs of extinction-again, the neurotic paradox.
One trial fear conditioning therefore should generate active avoidance responses that approach the persistence of avoidance seen in the human phobic and display the property of almost always avoiding the CS originally conditioned. Williams and Watson (1985) describe such avoidance of a CS:
Height phobics typically refrain from taking part in skiing long before they are standing in line for the chair lift; social phobics decline invitations to future social events from the safety of their living rooms; and bridge phobics plan vacation routes precisely to insure that they will not be confronted with an intimidating span. (pp. 138-139) It should be noted that if a basic behavioral principle can be identified that would produce almost complete avoidance of the conditioned aversive CS, it would solve the neurotic paradox since the conditions for extinction would be absent. Hilgard and Marquis (1940) summarized Guthrie's position concerning the problem: Guthrie's (1938) theory of neurotic symptoms is based largely on the proposition that neurotic behavior never gets extinguished because the neurotic individual avoids the stimuli in the presence of which extinction might take place. Thus fear ofhigh places can never be overcome if the person with that fear always avoids high places. (p. 293) Allport (1937) In a science of behavior we begin in the simplest way. We study relatively simple organisms with relatively simple histories and under relatively simple environmental conditions. In this way we obtain the degree ofrigor necessary for a scientific analysis. Our data are as uniform and reproducible as, say, the data of modem biology. It is true that the simplicity is to some extent artificial. We do not often find anything like it outside the laboratory-especially in the field of human behavior, which is of primary interest. As a result those who are impatient to get on to bigger issues are inclined to object to the "oversimplified" formulations of the laboratory. Their objections take the form, as in the example of Boyle's Law, of setting forth apparent exceptions to the rule. Such criticism is useful if it points to facts which have been unseen [204] [205] Quite clearly, many ofthe theoretical difficulties posed by critics might be explicable by a propitious combination of basic behavioral principles.
The development of a "laboratory" oriented treatment strategy based on extinction principles-implosive therapyin the late 1950s led to some interesting observations concerning phenomena related to the symptomatic behavior ofhuman patients (Stampfl, 1961 (Stampfl, , 1966 (Krasner, 1970) .
As early as 1959, it was evident that the aversive or anxiety evoking stimuli in the human patient were multiple, complex, and usually organized sequentially, and that contextual stimuli were important contributors to the total amount of fear or aversiveness controlling the symptomatic behavior of the patient. Avoidance (escape) behavior made to sets ofstimuli early in sequence precluded exposure to stimulus subsets later in the sequence. Skinner (1953) provides several examples of human avoidance behavior that implies a sequential ordering of different stimulus segments, each of which must be aversive to some degree. Clearly, such an arrangement would retard extinction since avoidance to early stimulus segments does not permit extinction to later stimulus segments in the sequence. The persistence of human symptomatic behavior (e.g., phobia) is partially explained by the serial or sequential ordering of stimuli. The conditions required for rapid acquisition of avoidance behavior could readily be inferred from an analysis ofcontext stimuli and stimulus complexity, but a nagging problem remained. Although rapid acquisition and greatly increased resistance to extinction was attained with rats using serial stimuli, the absolute number of responses before extinction did not seem sufficient to parallel the resistance to extinction seen in the human patient. Rats would make responses to stimuli early in the sequence, but extinction, followed by exposure to subsequent stimuli, would take place. What might be described as secondary intermittent reinforcement slowed the process, but progressive exposure and extinction of the avoidance response was inevitable.
The problem seemed related to the fact that human phobics typically respond predominantly to stimuli early in the sequence, but rats did not display this strong "fixation" to early stimuli. Avoidance of the main source of aversiveness correlated with subsequent stimulus segments in the human phobic precludes extinction from taking place to the subsequent aversive stimulus segments, exactly as Guthrie (1938) described. But what behavioral principle accounts for this strong "back-up" to early stimuli? It is easy, of course, to declare that humans are essentially different from rats, and that the behavioral principles governing humans are qualitatively different from rats.
A closer examination ofthe "back-up" tendency in human phobics, however, revealed that additional reinforcing events were present when avoidance (escape) responses were made to stimuli early in the sequence: Human phobic behavior involves not only a set of complex stimuli that vary in a sequential continuum, but the avoidance responses ofthe phobic are also variable and they differ in response cost such as increased work and other aversive consequences (Stampfl, 1983a ). This variability is in contrast to the usual laboratory avoidance experiment where the response requirement is relatively constant. The animal runs or jumps or presses the lever with essentially the same response requirement on each trial. The work requirement or response cost for the laboratory animal is essentially the same whether latencies are short or long, and is true also of serial CS preparations whether the response is made early or late in the sequence of stimuli. "Short latency" responses made by human phobics, however, frequently reduce the response cost such as increased work.
In terms of the examples of Williams and Watson (1985) , when a social phobic declines an invitation from the safety of the living room, such an avoidance response minimizes the amount of work involved. When a bridge phobic plans a vacation route so as to insure avoidance of bridges, it is evident that much less response cost is present than driving without a plan, encountering a bridge that is highly aversive, and only then stopping to plan a route where bridges are circumvented. Bridge phobics may on occasion fail to plan their route in advance. When this happens, however, they are punished by two consequences: (1) exposure to conditioned aversive stimuli (anxiety or fear) evoked by bridge stimuli and (2) the punishing response cost ofwork and other negative consequences correlated with the failure to plan the route in advance. In the human condition, such failure might include punishing consequences such as loss of time and money, social embarrassment, frustration, etc., as well as more work. It should also be evident that the planned vacation route may be made at any point along a spatial-temporal distance dimension to the bridge. This basic sequence is applicable to many if not the majority of human phobias.
In this view, the avoidance response typically "backs up" quite rapidly to stimuli early in the sequence for the human phobic by the punishing consequences of increased exposure to more aversive stimulus segments and of increased response cost in the greater work requirement. Responses to early stimulus segments in the sequence minimize both sources of aversiveness. It is the summation of the two sources that produces the total amount of aversiveness in the situation.
Another reinforcing factor is present in the human situation. When the bridge phobic plans a route in advance or the social phobic declines an invitation to a future social event from the safety of a living room, the response is followed for a period oftime by freedom from having to make avoidance responses. Timeout from avoidance responding (e.g., Baron, DeWaard, & Lipson, 1977) provides optimal conditions for reducing to a minimum both conditioned aversive stimuli and response cost.
Timeout from avoidance responding may provide another independent source of reinforcement for early responses by permitting self-generated positively reinforced behavior to be emitted during the timeout period. This function oftimeout in the human situation appears obvious since it permits, for a period of time, a large repertoire of positively reinforced responses common to everyday human behavior. A similar interpretation is possible for the rat also, because timeout provides the opportunity to engage in uninterrupted grooming and other potentially self-generated positively reinforcing behaviors during the timeout period.
It should also be noted that the human phobic's early responses followed by timeout maximizes timeout periods per unit of time.
There are other variables clearly operative in human phobic and other psychopathological behavior. The description given above, however, is sufficient to describe the main features relevant to the research presented below (Stampfl, 1983b (Stampfl, , 1985 (Stampfl, , 1986 
Procedure
Rats receive 10 min ofexploration time in the entire apparatus (5 min with the floor stationary and 5 min with the floor moving). All rats highly prefer the black compartment as indicated by time spent in it during this 10 min period.
Following this exploratory period, the rat is placed at the far end (photocell end) of the straight alley and permitted to return to the black compartment. The black barrier is placed in front of the black compartment, and 10 sec later footshock is delivered. Simultaneously, the black barrier is removed permitting escape from the black compartment. Rats reliably run to the far end of the straight alley where they remain motionless. Three minutes after escaping shock, the rat is moved in the direction of the black compartment by initiating floor movement in the direction of the black compartment. Rats typically remain motionless on the first trial until they enter the black sidewall section (16 in) that precedes entry to the black compartment. At this point, they promptly run to the far end ofthe straight alley breaking the photocell and stopping the floor. Three minutes later a second trial is given by moving the floor, the response of running to the far end of the alley and breaking the photocell defines the active avoidance response. A 2 h session is given following this procedure. In the second session, a fixed-ratio for responding is gradually imposed until the rat makes 10 responses (breaks the photocell 10 times) for each 3 min timeout from avoidance responding. Two hour sessions are given several times a week with the FR 10 requirement.
Results
Following the single shock trial, rats reliably run to the far end of the straight alley where they remain motionless during the 3 min timeout period. On the first avoidance trial, rats remain motionless until the floor carries them to the black sidewall section where they respond quickly by running back to the photocell white end of the straight alley. Thereafter, rats quickly learn to make responses that minimize the distance traversed to break the photocell and obtain timeout from making avoidance responses. Rather than wait and be carried by the moving floor towards the "phobic" black compartment, rats quickly learn to make responses that minimize conditioned aversive stimuli, and the work requirement. They move a few inches rather than several feet. Under these conditions rats make more than one thousand successive avoidance responses over five 2 h sessions without a single entry into the "phobic" black compartment. In fact, there is little indication that reentry to the highly aversive "phobic" black compartment is imminent. Responses are predominantly made at the far end ofthe white alley and very infrequently is the rat carried to the black sidewall section preceding the black compartment before responding. Various controls indicate that the work component is independently aversive, and that the contingency between responding by breaking the photocell and obtaining timeout is critical to sustained responding. Rats given a single shock trial and trained noncontingently with the same floor movement time, the same number of timeouts, and the same number of photocell clicks, in the same order as an animal contingently trained, extinguishes quite rapidly (usually fewer than 100 responses) by reentering the black grid compartment. The apparatus permits a number of manipulations that are not possible in the usual active avoidance apparatus. By using barriers that rest on the moving floor, the latency ofactive avoidance responses can be controlled and the point in the alley where they occur is under the control of the experimenter and not determined by the rat's avoidance behavior. Response delay or prevention trials ofdifferent durations can be introduced or shock trials given at any time.
DISCUSSION
Animal laboratory research typically does not include the requirements to demonstrate adequately the correspondence with known features ofhuman psychopathological behavior such as phobias and avoidance learning. One example is that of the work requirement that differs in humans, but is maintained as a constant in laboratory studies of avoidance. By combining principles of behavior derived from an analysis of key variables present in human phobic behavior, it is possible to meet major objections to conventional models ofavoidance learning that postulate simple conditioned aversive or fear evoking contingencies as controlling variables in such behavior. The present research provides evidence for one trial fear conditioning, complete avoidance of the "phobic" CS, and truly persistent avoidance responding that offers a solution to the neurotic paradox. The determination ofthe combination of variables responsible for the prediction were drawn from observations employing an animal model for the treatment of human disorders. Such a procedure confers strong additional validity to the animal model originally used for the treatment of humans. It is the case that the critical variables identified, such as the sequential ordering of stimuli, secondary intermittent reinforcement, contribution of context stimuli, work requirement, timeout, and the critical function of the "backup" phenomenon have been less thoroughly examined than other variables in laboratory research. The use of variables less well investigated may add to, rather than subtract from, the strength of the present analysis. The predictions are not trivial, but represent solutions to central limitations that have been advanced to deemphasize the value of learning models that were successful in the development of new human treatment strategies in the first place. It was reasonable to specify these limitations because decades of research in the laboratory failed to reveal the phenomena thought critical to the human condition. By no means does the present analysis exhaust the possibilities for the solution ofother "limitations" specified by critics. Also, there are many implications of the present research for a number ofcontemporary versions of avoidance learning.
In a word, the contemporary learning and conditioning literature provides marvelous opportunities for the further understanding of human clinical phenomena.
